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Interest-Free Loans
Marvin S. Lieber*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 has overturned years of established precedent and administrative practice in which interest-free
loans were not treated as taxable transactions. Historically, interest-free loans provided a substantial advantage to individuals desirous of transferring assets to individuals with lower incomes. The
transfer was with minimal or no adverse tax consequences.
Interest-free loans or below-market rate loans usually occur in
three situations: (1) loans between family members; (2) loans between a corporation and an employee; and (3) loans between a corporation and a shareholder. The loans between family members occur either in the gift situation or in the transfer of assets for value
between family members. Loans between a corporation and an employee are a form of employee benefit which became popular because of the necessity to encourage employees to remain with the
corporation or to attract superior employees to the corporation.
Loans between a corporation and shareholder were undertaken in
order to avoid taxable income to the shareholder, or to alleviate
the possibility of unreasonable amounts of compensation.
The tax planning aspects of interest-free loans provided numerous opportunities. The loans also afforded an opportunity to borrowers where conventional financing sources were unavailable.
From the inception of modern tax laws in 1913 until 1961, the
government did not treat such loans as taxable events either by
rule, regulation or litigation.
The courts have consistently determined that interest-free loans
do not constitute taxable income to the borrower. On the other
hand, such loans were held not to constitute income to the lender.
* The author is a member of the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania law firm of Berkman Ruslander Pohl Lieber & Engel; President, Pennsylvania Bar Institute; Fellow, College of Probate Council. The author wishes to thank Penina K. Lieber for her assistance in the research of this article.
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The leading case of J. Simpson Dean v. Commissioner' and its
progeny established judicial refusal to change the non-taxable status of interest-free loans. The court stated:
We have heretofore given full force to interest-free loans for tax purposes,
holding that they result in no interest deduction for the borrower . . . nor
interest income to the lender . . . . We think it to be equally true that an
interest-free loan results in no taxable gain to the borrower, and we hold
that the Commissioner is not entitled to any increased deficiency based
upon this issue.2

The courts consistently rejected the Internal Revenue Service's efforts to impose tax consequences until the Dickman v. Commissioner3 case. The Supreme Court determined that an interest-free
demand note is a taxable gift of the use of the money. The Supreme Court stated:
A substantial no-interest loan from parent to child creates significant tax
benefits for the lender quite apart from the economic advantages to the borrower. This is especially so when an individual in a high income tax bracket
transfers income-producing property to an individual in a lower income tax
bracket, thereby reducing the taxable income of the high-bracket taxpayer
at the expense, ultimately, of all other taxpayers and the government. Subjecting interest-free loans to gift taxation minimizes the potential loss to the
federal fisc generated by the use of such loans as an income tax avoidance
mechanism for the transferor. Gift taxation of interest-free loans also effectuates Congress' desire to supplement the estate tax provisions. A gratuitous transfer of income-producing property may enable the transferor to
avoid the future estate tax liability that would result if the earnings generated by the property-rent, interest, or dividends-became a part of the
transferor's estate. Imposing the gift tax upon interest-free loans bolsters
the estate
tax by preventing the diminution of the transferor's estate in this
4
fashion.

This article examines the status of interest-free loans following
Dickman and the enactment of certain provisions of the Deficit
Reduction Act. First traced is the case law and statutory background of interest-free loans before these recent developments. An
analysis and description of the new provisions follows this back1. 35 T.C. 1083 (1961), nonacq., 1973-2 C.B. 4.
2. Id. at 1090 (citing A. Backus, Jr. & Sons, 6 B.T.A. 590 (1928); Rainbow Gasoline
Corp., 31 B.T.A. 1050 (1934); Howell Turpentine Co., 6 T.C. 364, rev'd on anotherissue, 162
F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1946); D. Loveman & Son Export Corp., 34 T.C. 776 (1960); Combs Lumber Co., 41 B.T.A. 339 (1940); Society Brand Clothes, Inc., 18 T.C. 304 (1952); Brandtjen &
Kluge, Inc., 34 T.C. 416 (1960)).
3. 690 F.2d 812 (11th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 1086, reh'g denied, 104 S. Ct. 1932
(1984).
4. 104 S.Ct. at 1092.
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ground. Finally, interest-free loans are examined from a tax planning aspect.
II.

CASE LAW PRIOR TO

A.

Dickman

The Income Tax Issue

The basic issues involved with interest-free loans in the income
tax context are (1) whether income can be imputed to the borrower
on the receipt of the benefits from the loan; and (2) whether income can be assessed to the lender in making a bona fide interestfree loan. The Internal Revenue Service has consistently argued
that there is a tax consequence both to the borrower and to the
lender. The courts have held to the contrary in stating that interest-free loans do not give rise to income tax. The Tax Court has
held that where the interest accrued on a loan is deductible it is
unnecessary to impose a tax on the borrower equal to the economic
value of the loan. Any imputed income to the borrower from the
loan would be offset by a corresponding deduction for the imputed
interest on the loan. In J. Simpson Dean v. Commissioner, the
court stated:
Here, on the other hand, had petitioners borrowed the funds in question on
interest-bearing notes, their payment of interest would have been fully, deductible by them under section 163, I.R.C. 1954. Not only would they not be
charged with the additional income in controversy herein, but they would
have a deduction equal to that very amount.5

The court's reasoning was contrary to the Internal Revenue Service position that the taxpayer realized economic benefit from the
interest-free use of funds borrowed by the taxpayer from a familycontrolled corporation. While the Tax Court entertained the argument of the Internal Revenue Service, the court concluded that
any economic benefit would be offset by a corresponding
deduction.
It is ironic that for a twelve-year period after Dean the Internal
Revenue Service did not indicate acquiescence or non-acquiesence.
Thereafter, the Commissioner applied a non-acquiesence to the
Dean decision.' Subsequent decisions were also supportive of the
taxpayer's position that interest-free loans do not result in taxable
gain to the borrower. As recently as 1983 in Hardee v. United
5.
6.

35. T.C. at 1090.
1973-2 C.B. 4.
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States7 the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
stated that the law was settled as to the applicable tax imposed on
interest-free loans. The court in Hardee stated that a majority
shareholder's borrowed funds from a controlled corporation were
not taxable income especially where the prior decisions of five circuit courts over a number of years had been consistent. In addition, to overturn the settled tax law in this particular area of interest-free loans would create uncertainty and uneven application of
the tax laws:
As we stated above, however, the accepted interpretation of tax law supporting the Dean holding does not depend on the ability of a borrower to
have structured a loan transaction in which interest is paid in such a way as
to "wash out" his interest payments in order to attain the benefit of a nontaxed, interest-free loan. Rather, the accepted interpretation of the definition of taxable income does not encompass the benefit of such an interestfree loan in the first place. Thus, it is immaterial that no statutory authority
exists for imputing a deduction for imputed interest payments, or that no
statutory authority authorizes equal treatment for economically equivalent
transactions when one of those transactions depends on the ability to deduct interest payments.8

There were no rulings by the Internal Revenue Service during
this span of years to challenge the settled judicial authority.
B.

The Gift Tax Issue

Concurrent with the income tax question of interest-free loans,
the Internal Revenue Service raised the possibility that a loan
without interest constituted a taxable gift from the lender to the
borrower. This was especially true in demand loans. Despite the
expansive language of Treasury Regulation 25.2512-8, which provides that the gift tax embraces dispositions of property "to the
extent that the value of the property transferred by the donor exceeds the value in money or money's worth of the consideration
given therefor . . ." the courts construed the statute narrowly to
exclude interest-free demand loans. Such loans were recognized to
be temporary transfers lacking donative intent since they were potentially due for payment at the whim of the lender.
In Crown v. Commissioner,0 the court rejected the Internal Revenue Service's attempt to impose a gift tax on interest imputed to
7.
8.
9.
10.

708 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Id. at 665.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1958).
585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
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intra-family interest-free loans. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that no taxable gift occurred where the lender gave
money to his children and other close family members through demand loans. The recipient of the loan had no legally protected interest. The court reasoned that no property right was transferred
by the loan, and also cited theoretical and practical problems of
valuation, since the value of the right to repayment at the time the
loan is extended is "unknown and unknowable." In prior decisions
such as Johnson v. United States," it was held that where there is
no contractual agreement to pay interest the borrower has no legal
dxlty to pay interest on the loan. Any contrary decision in support
of the government's position would constitute judicial legislation:
The time has not yet come when a parent must suddenly deal at arm's
length with his children when they finish their education and start out in
life. There is no legal requirement, express or implied, to charge them interest on money advanced to them at that stage, whether it be to open a law
office and hang out a shingle, to go into the oil business on a substantial
scale, or to begin life on their own in some other way. The fact that the
Johnsons were financially able to make substantial loans to their children
does not change the principle involved. It is to the credit of the entire family that children of those wealthy parents had the judgment to use their
money in such a way that they were able to repay almost the entire loans
during their father's lifetime.'"

III.

TAXABLE GIFTS FROM INTEREST-FREE DEMAND LOANS AND
TERM LOANS

In Dickman v. Commissioner," the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held that taxable gifts do arise from interest-free demand
loans. The Internal Revenue Service claimed a gift tax on the reasonable value of the use of the money lent to the borrower. Where
an interest-free demand loan is made to a child or to a closely held
family corporation, the court reasoned that a gift occurred which is
subject to tax. In construing the language of the gift tax statute,
the court held that Congress intended to reach any gratuitous
transfer of an interest in property as a gift.
In contrast to the Crown case, the court reasoned that the use of
valuable property was a legally protected property interest that
produced a measurable economic benefit capable of being taxed.
The tax was imposed because the value of the interest could be
11. 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
12. Id. at 77.
13. 690 F.2d 812 (11th Cir. 1982), a/I'd, 104 S. Ct. 1086 (1984).

1024

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 23:1019

determined by reference to current interest rates. The Supreme
Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit and held that the gratuitous
transfer is subject to gift tax.
Interest-free or below-market term loans as distinguished from
demand loans have been treated as taxable gifts.' 4 Term loans
have consistently been valued by the courts at their fair market
value based on the rate of interest charged. Any term loan below
current interest rates was subject to gift tax:
While the petitioner contends that the transfers were arm's-length transactions, the evidence in the record simply does not support its position.
Even though the decedent may have had a profit motive in making these
transfers because the interest rate on the notes was higher than he was
earning on his money otherwise, this factor alone does not mean that the
transfers were made at arm's length. There are other factors here which
must be considered. To begin with, the decedent was over 75 years old when
he began making these transfers in exchange for notes due in 20 years. In
addition, the decedent took no security on these notes. Moreover, the notes
did not require any principal payments until maturity. Finally-, the transferees, the decedent's daughter and son-in-law, were the natural objects of his
bounty. In his will, the decedent directed that all his property be divided
equally between his two daughters. As a result, Barbara Given was bequeathed one half of the notes on which she was a debtor. Taking all these
factors into account, we conclude that the petitioner has failed to meet its
burden of proof that the transfers were at arm's length and free of donative
intent.1"

IV.

THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF

1984

The Deficit Reduction Act reclassified interest-free and belowmarket loans. Such loans were defined by Congress as arm's-length
transactions where the lender is deemed to have made a loan to
the borrower in exchange for an agreement requiring payment of
interest at a statutorily established rate. The non-interest charge
or below-market interest is taxable income to the lender and is deductible by the borrower to the extent that the borrower itemizes
deductions. This is true if: (1) the borrower itemizes deductions;
and (2) the interest deduction does not exceed investment interest
limitations. The statute further differentiates between a gift, compensation or a dividend. The differentiation is based upon the relationship of the borrower and the lender.
The types of loans covered by section 172 of the Deficit Reduc14. See, e.g., Estate of Meyer B. Berkman, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 183 (1979); Blackburn v.
Commissioner, 20 T.C. 204 (1953).
15. Estate of Meyer B. Berkman, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 186.
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tion Act are:
1. Gift Loans. These loans occur regardless of the relationship
between the borrower and the lender.
2. Compensation-Related Loans. These occur between an employer and employee or an independent contractor and the end
party requiring services.
3. Corporation-ShareholderLoans.
4. Tax Avoidance Loans. A loan where the primary purpose is
tax avoidance.
5. Other loans which are not specifically designated in the regulations but have a significant effect on the tax liability of either
borrower or the lender.16
The amount of the imputed interest is the difference between
the interest that the lender charges, if any, and the rates prescribed by the IRS under section 1274.17 The prescribed rate is
based on the interest rate paid by the government to borrow
money on the open market. The first determination of applicable
federal rates was announced on September 30, 1984 and applied as
of January 1, 1985. For periods prior to 1985, the applicable rate
was ten percent per annum, compounded semi-annually. The Internal Revenue Service on February 20, 1985 issued a Revenue
Ruling establishing the interest rates for March, 1985. The rates
are an alternative method of imputing interest when the interest
rates in the statute are higher than those of the Revenue Ruling.18
16. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, § 172, 98 Stat. 699 (codified at 26 U.S.C.A. §
7872 (West Supp. 1985)).
17. See id. § 41 (codified at 26 U.S.C.A. § 1274 (West Supp. 1985)).
18. Rev. Rul. 85-21, I.R.B. 1985-9. Pursuant to section 1.1274-6T of the Temporary
Income Tax Regulations, the federal short-term, mid-term, and long-term applicable federal
rates (AFR) for the month of March, 1985 computed under the alternate method are as
follows:
Monthly
Semiannual
Quarterly
Annual

110%
120%

AFR
AFR
AFR

9.77%
10.77%
11.78%

Short-Term
9.54%
10.49%
11.45%

9.43%
10.36%
11.29%

9.36%
10.27%
11.19%

110%
120%

AFR
AFR
AFR

11.30%
12.47%
13.64%

Mid-Term
11.00%
12.10%
13.20%

10.85%
11.92%
12.99%

10.76%
11.81%
12.85%

110%
120%

AFR
AFR
AFR

11.72%
12.93%
14.15%

Long-Term
11.40%
12.54%
13.68%

11.24%
12.35%
13.45%

11.14%
12.22%
13.31%
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Income Tax Treatment

All gift loans, whether term or demand, receive the same income
tax treatment. The borrower is treated as having paid a designated
market rate of interest to the lender. The lender is treated as having received the imputed interest for each day that the loan is outstanding, making the amount includable in income. Imputed interest is treated as having been paid to the lender on the last day of
the taxable year.
B.

Gift Tax Treatment

Gift tax treatment on gift demand loans is applied to the value
of the imputed interest imposed on the principal of the loan, and is
treated as having been made to the borrower on the last day of the
calendar year. The lender is deemed to have made a taxable gift to
the borrower equal to the amount of the interest; the borrower in
turn is deemed to have made an interest payment to, the lender.
The deemed annual payment is the amount of interest that would
accrue on the loan during each calendar year, using applicable federal rates less actual interest paid. The deemed accrued rate will
vary according to changes in federal rates over the life of the loan.
Gift tax on gift term loans is computed by subtracting from the
amount of the loan the present value of all principal and uncharged interest payments due as determined by Internal Revenue
Service rates. The lender is treated as making a gift on the date
the loan is made. The borrower is treated as re-transferring to the
lender the amount of interest that would have accrued on an annual basis. Such amounts are not subject to witholding under
Chapter 24 of the Internal Revenue Code.
A husband and wife are treated as one person for purposes of all
gift loans. The amount of imputed interest is determined by the
aggregate amount of loans outstanding between the borrower and
the lender. The imputed interest rules do not apply for any day if
the amount of outstanding gift loans between individuals does not
exceed $10,000. There are no income or gift taxes imposed on the
loans between a borrower and a lender (including a spouse) if the
aggregate balance of all loans between the parties is $10,000 or less,
provided that the loans are not attributable to purchasing or carrying income-producing assets.19
If loans not in excess of $100,000 are made without a primary
19.

26 U.S.C.A. § 7872 (West Supp. 1985).
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tax avoidance purpose, no interest is imputed to a borrower (and
spouse) if the borrower has net investment income of $1,000 or
less. Net investment income means interest, dividends, rent and
the like. In practice, the imputed interest is not burdensome. For
example, parents may lend a child (and spouse) $100,000 with no
stated interest, but neither of them would be burdened by imputed
interest:
Child's Net
Investment
Income

Interest
Rate

$1,000
$2,000
$3,000

12%
12%
12%

Imputed
Interest
Deductible

Interest
Income
Reported

by Child

by Parents

0
$2,000
$3,000

0
$2,000
$3,000

Gift
by
Parents
0
$12,000
$12,000

The major impact is that the child (and spouse) cannot claim
the imputed interest of $12,000 but are limited to the net investment income amount as a deduction. 0
The statute defines net investment income as investment income
minus investment expenses. 21 Investment income includes rent, interest, dividends, royalties, short-term capital gain and any gain on
the sale of depreciable or mineral property recaptured as ordinary
income. Investment expenses include deductions for business expenses, bad debts, depreciation, amortizable bond premiums, production of income expenses, and cost depletion. If the net investment income is greater than $1,000, interest will be imputed but
will be limited to the net investment income.
For any day that the aggregate amount owed by the borrower to
the lender exceeds $100,000, interest and expenses will be imputed
on the entire amount of the loan outstanding, not merely the
amount in excess of $100,000.
C.

Treatment of Non-Gift Loans

Non-gift interest-free or low-interest loans include corporationshareholder loans, compensation-related loans and any other loan
determined by the Internal Revenue Service to be made for the
purpose of tax avoidance or impacting on the tax liability of the
lender or borrower.
On non-gift term loans the amount of imputed interest is equal
20. Id. § 7872(d)(1)(A), (E).
21.

STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,

98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION

REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION AcT OF 1984 536.

OF THE
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to the amount of the loan minus the present value of all principal
and interest payments due under the loan. The lender is treated as
transferring and the borrower as receiving the excess of the
amount loaned over the present value of the payments required by
the terms of the loan. This excess is considered received and includable in income on the date the loan is made or on the first date
that I.R.C. section 7872 applies. The excess is treated as Original
Issue Discount (OID), as if it were re-transferred to the lender over
the life of the loan under the OID rules for a debt issued after July
1, 1982." Under OID rules, the lender is deemed to receive interest
at a constant yield to maturity over the life of the loan, while the
borrower may deduct this interest to the same extent as if it were
actually paid. The deemed original issue discount is in addition to
any actual OID on the loan:
The issue price of an obligation is the stated principal amount unless
there is inadequate stated interest. The adequacy of the interest element in
a transaction is determined by comparing the debt instrument's stated principal amount to the "testing amount"-the amount determined by discounting, at a rate equal to 110 percent of the applicable Federal rate, all
payments due under the instrument. An instrument contains adequate
stated interest if the stated principal amount is less than the testing
amount.
If a debt instrument does not contain adequate stated interest, section
1274 deems the principal amount (and the issue price) of the instrument to
be the "imputed principal amount." The imputed principal amount is the
amount determined by discounting all payments due under the instrument
using a discount rate equal to 120 percent of the applicable Federal rate,
compounded semiannually.
Section 1273, which replaces section 1232(b)(1) of prior law, provides that
the amount of original issue discount is the difference between the issue
price of an instrument and its stated redemption price at maturity. Although the issue price of an instrument issued for nontraded property for
purposes of section 1273 is generally either the stated principal amount or
the imputed principal amount, in certain "potentially abusive situations"
neither of these amounts may determine the issue price, as discussed

below.1

On non-gift demand loans the borrower is treated as having paid
interest to the lender and as having received an identical amount
from the lender (wage, dividend, or other payment depending on
the nature of the transaction). While the borrower may deduct the
imputed interest payment, he must include it in income as wage,
22.

26 U.S.C.A. § 1272 (West Supp. 1985).

23.

STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE

REVENUE PROVISION OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF

1984 115.
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dividend or other payment. Employment tax witholding and information reporting are required as if the deemed payments were actual payments; however, no income tax witholding is required.
Interest-free and low-interest loans, both compensation-related
and corporation-shareholder, are exempt from the imputation of
interest and expenses if the aggregate amount on any day is
$10,000 or less, unless a primary purpose of the loan is tax avoidance. Below-market loans with a business purpose are not subject
to the provisions of the statute. Sales of property that provide for
deferred payments, including unstated interest, are not within the
scope of the statute. They are governed by the existing provisions
relating specifically to such transactions.
Congress has extended the original interest discount rules to apply to all transactions under $2,000,000.24 As long as the interest
rate is nine percent on any transaction under $2,000,000 prior to
July 1, 1985, there will be no imputed interest. If the interest rate
is less than nine percent or is not stated at nine percent, or if the
interest rate unstated or at a reduced rate is less than 110% of the
applicable federal interest rate, interest will be imputed at 120%
of the federal interest rate.
The new law applies to term loans made after June 6, 1984. The
Deficit Reduction Act also applies to demand loans outstanding after June 6, 1984, but not to demand loans outstanding on June 6,
1984 that were repaid prior to September 16, 1984 (the 60th day
after the date of enactment). The new rules do not apply to any
loan made to nursing homes and continuing care facilities by residents of those facilities if payments were made prior to June 6,
1984.25
On November 1, 1984 the Internal Revenue Service issue Revenue Ruling 84-163. The Service stated:
Recently enacted legislation (H.R. 5361) will affect sales or exchanges of
property (other than new section 38 property) occurring from January 1
through June 30, 1985. This legislation establishes a testing rate (in lieu of
110 percent of the applicable federal rate) of 9 percent for such sales or
exchanges to the extent the stated principal amounts of all debt instru24. P.L. 98-612, 98 Stat. 3182, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS,
amended section 44(b) of the Tax Reform Act of 1984. This amendment delayed implementation of the new imputed interest rates from January 1, 1984 to June 30, 1985, with respect
to principal loans below $2,000,000.
25. The discretion of the Internal Revenue Service is invoked by the Conference Report accompanying the Act which states that no inference is intended respecting treatment
of these payments after June 5, 1984. Any loan that is renegotiated, extended, or revised
after June 6, 1984 is treated as a new loan.
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2
ments arising from the same transaction do not exceed $2 million."

Senator Robert Dole, Senate Majority Leader, in a letter to Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy Ronald Pearlman, expressed disapproval of one aspect of Revenue Ruling 84-163: "In
my view the Congress did not intend the principal amount of otherwise exempt assumed loans to be aggregated with new debt for
purposes of this temporary relief measure. "27
V. TAX PLANNING AFTER THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT
A.

Family Loans

Intra-family interest-free loans may still be viable. A parent may
make interest-free loans to a child, child's trustee or custodian to
be invested for future college expenses; however, the amount of the
loan will be limited to $10,000. Since a husband and wife are
treated as one taxpayer under the statute, separate loans by each
spouse will not increase the limitation. The use of an interest-free
loan, as a substitute for a ten-year Clifford trust in order to accumulate savings for college education expenses has been restricted
by the new law. Clifford trusts, spousal remainder trusts, and outright gifts will often be preferred as intra-family income shifting
techniques.28 Interest-free loans may still be advantageous where
the borrower is in a higher income tax bracket than the lender. For
example, if the lender is a corporation and the borrower an individual, both of whom are taxed at the highest current rate, the
lender will be taxed on the imputed interest at forty-six percent,
but the borrower will be able to deduct that interest against income taxed at fifty percent, resulting in a clear advantage.
Compensatory loans will still be viable as fringe benefits. If the
employee is able to use the imputed interest deduction, it may be
assumed that the imputed income will be fully offset by the deduction. The employer will recognize interest income, but will also receive an offsetting deduction for compensation treated as paid to
the employee. If the employee's regular wages and compensation
exceed the wage base for Social Security Tax, no employment tax
would be payable. The tax liability on the imputed interest income
26. Rev. Rul. 84-163, 1984-47 I.R.B. 25 (emphasis added).
27. Tax Administration: Dole Requests Treasury Guidance on Imputed Interest Provisions, DAILY TAX REPORT (BNA) No. 4, at G-3-5 (January 7, 1985).
28. See Braun v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 210 (1984), where trust income was
held taxable to the grantor. The duty to support is extended to tuition, room and board for
a private high school, college and post-graduate education.
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will almost always be a lesser financial burden on the employee
than the after-tax cost of paying the market rate interest on a loan.
Caution must be exercised in corporation-shareholder loans. The
Internal Revenue Service is likely to treat the imputed payment to
the shareholder as a non-deductible dividend rather than as deductible compensation. The Internal Revenue Service might challenge the deduction as constituting unreasonably excessive compensation. An interest-free loan could increase retirement benefits
where an employer makes compensatory no-interest loans to key
employees. The new rules on retirement benefits are computed on
the basis of total compensation. The employer should review the
impact of the new rules before making such loans. Where the interest on a loan is forgiven on an annual basis, the substance of the
overall transaction may be the economic equivalent of a belowmarket loan and should be treated as such.
Short term trusts provide a viable alternative method of shifting
income to family members.
B.

Clifford Trust

The trust must last no less than a term extending beyond the
lesser of the life of the income beneficiary or ten years and one
day. The transfers to a Clifford trust are measured by the above
criteria as each individual transfer occurs. Transfers to a Clifford
trust are subject to the restrictions applicable to obligations of
support of beneficiaries by the creator of the trust.2" A gift tax is
imposed on the income interest transferred.
C.

Spousal Remainder Trust

One spouse funds the trust for the income beneficiary with the
corpus transferred to the other spouse at the end of the designated
period of time. This period may be less than the ten years and one
day required for a Clifford trust. The legal title passes to the
spouse at the end of a designated period, thus the change in ownership eliminates a need for a prescribed time period. 30
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 has substantially reduced the
29. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
30. Braun, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) at 213. The obligation of support may apply to adult
children.
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availability of interest-free loans as a tax planning tool. There are
still opportunities to employ interest-free loans in family transactions and employer-employee loans. Loans of $10,000 or less, aggregate loans of $100,000 under prescribed restrictions and loans
between higher and lower bracket taxpayers are still viable methods for tax planning.
To shift large amounts of income to lower brackets, tax planners
must now revert to the Clifford trust and the spousal remainder
trust. When the income shift occurs, the transferor of the assets
loses the dominion of the assets, together with the immediate accessibility of the assets to satisfy a financial crisis. Especially in the
spousal remainder trust, the dominion over the assets is forever
lost. The loss of ownership is balanced against the reduction in
taxable income. The favorable income tax results outweigh the lack
of dominion. These trusts will be used frequently as a consequence
of the Deficit Reduction Act.

